Larry Haftl.com
Island Fork, Kentucky, Fire Takes Two Lives
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About 4:30 in the afternoon of April 6,1999, a small brush fire broke out near Island Fork Road a few miles north of the eastern Kentucky town of Cranston. Within minutes a local homeowner called 9-1-1 with the report and by 4:35 ten firefighters and one engine from the Route 377 Volunteer Fire Department were dispatched for initial attack. A minute later a second engine with five firefighters from the Morehead Fire Department several miles south of Cranston was also dispatched.
When the Route 377 volunteers reached the scene at 4:47 they found the fire immediately threatening a home and greenhouse. Danny Blevins, the incident commander, immediately divided his firefighters into two crews. Three firefighters and the engine began a direct attack to protect the structures. The other seven, under crew leader Eddie McCleese, used a leaf blower and hand tools to build a fire line up a drainage to the east to flank the fire. "I made it clear to the crew that there would be no attempt to get in front of this fire," said Blevins. We were just going to flank the fire and keep it off the structures."
Fuel was a continuous bed of light, fluffy hardwood leaf litter between six inches and two feet deep. Trees in that area are hardwoods with occasional white pine. Average tree height is 90 feet with very little mid-story vegetation. The temperature was 74 degrees F, the relative humidity was 24-27 percent, and the wind blew from the west at about 14 mph. The Kentucky Division of Forestry had rated fire danger that day as high (Class 4), but not extreme (Class 5). Twenty-seven other wildland fires were burning in eastern Kentucky when this one started.
With winds from the west the firefighters were trying to cut a fire line east up the drainage on the north flank of the fire. The terrain up the drainage is "classic chute/chimney," according to the fire investigation report. The slopes averaged 40 percent, the drainage ran east-to-west then turned southeast, the elevation difference was 280 feet, and there was a slope difference of 600 feet with varying aspects.
At the head of the hand line crew were Kevin Rex Smith, 30, and Kenneth Allen Nickell, 28. Using a leaf blower and rake, Smith and Nickell had gotten about 250 feet out in front of the rest of the crew but were still in contact with the crew leader visually and by radio. It was at this point that things got really ugly. The leaf blower quit working. Nickell thought it was out of gas and called for more. The winds, which had been blowing fairly steady, began to gust up to 35 mph or more, and spot fires broke out north of the fire line. The other five men on the hand crew attacked the spot fires but couldn't control them. The crew leader, seeing the danger, ordered the entire crew out.
"The crew leader radioed me that they were getting a lot of spot fires and couldn't do anything with them," said Blevlns. "He said he ordered his men off the line and they were pulling back. I confirmed that. They [Smith and Nickell] got that order and said to the crew leader they were 'code 10-51 your way,' which means they were coming out toward the crew. That's when the fire blew up and they got burned. They called and said they both got burned but not real bad. From there they headed east up the hollow looking for a way out."
While the crew from Route 377 was building the fire line on the north flank of the fire, the crew from Morehead was coming up and over the ridge on the south flank. About the time Smith and Nickell were getting cut off, two scouts from the Morehead department reached the top of the south ridge overlooking the fire. They described the fire as a 40-foot-high wall of flame moving rapidly in a clockwise direction and so loud that they could not hear each other talking. They could hear Smith and Kickell on the radio and called out to them, but their calls went unanswered. With the heavy smoke and fire being driven uphill towards them, the two scouts realized they could not help Smith and Nickell and moved into a small area south of the ridgetop where the fire would be backing down the hill after it made its run over the top of the hill.
The rest of the Route 377 firefighters wanted to go after Smith and Nickell, but Blevlns ordered them to wait because of the extreme fire behavior. That order probably saved their lives. Blevlns eventually allowed the firefighters to look for Smith and Nickell, but ordered them to stay in the burned area as they work their way up the drainage. At 5:35 p.m., less than one hour after they arrived at the fire, Smith and Nickell were found. Both were dead. The Coroner later determined that the cause of death was smoke Inhalation.
An interagency team was formed to investigate the fire, and issued their report on August 3. Copies are available from the Kentucky Division of Forestry, (502) 564- 4496.
The report commends "the rapid response by Route 377 VFD to initially attack the fire," "the IC's action to call all firefighters off the fire line probably saved the lives of 5+ firefighters," and "the two scouts with the Morehead Fire Department ... for their decision not to go into the drainage but to instead construct a safe area away from the blowup situation."
The report also Includes five recommendations. They are:
1. Develop a process of improved Information management to keep Volunteer Fire Departments (VFDs) Informed of weather during fire season.
2. Develop a simulation exercise of the Island Fork Fire for use by VFDs.
3. Develop a plan to implement the standards of NFPA 1051, "Wildland Firefighter Professional Qualifications"
4. Develop a plan and process to Implement the standards of NFPA 1077, "Standard on Protective Clothing and Equipment for Wildland Firefighting."
5. Develop a common communications plan (radios, frequencies, cells) to include adequate radios for VFDs, common frequencies, use of cell phones, and procedures.
he deaths of Kevin Rex Smith and Kenneth Allen Nickell may be a catalyst that can save lives in the future if the report's recommendations are acted upon. Unfortunately, that is a big if. Implementing the recommendations will require overcoming substantial economic and institutional barriers.
The first recommendation is to improve weather Information for VFDs. "In Eastern Kentucky," said Blevlns, "our county, like the other counties, doesn't have ready availability of weather forecasts. A few minutes before the blowup I placed a cell phone call to the [Kentucky] Division of Forestry trying to get a weather report. I don't know who I got over there but they put me on hold for several minutes. The winds started picking up and things began to happen while I was waiting, so I cut the call and made the decision to pull the crew out of there.
"Since that fire we get weather reports every time we are dispatched to a wildland fire. These reports only give you an off-scene picture, but it might give you an idea of what you are going to have when you get to the fire."
The ability to get timely and accurate weather reports is only part of the solution. Knowing what to do with them is another part. "Our volunteers are not out In the woods every day," said Blevlns. "They are coming out of houses or air conditioned offices or trucks and the weather doesn't mean much to them. If they get any wildland training at all it's usually only the basic wildland courses. I took the intermediate fire behavior course and it really opens your eyes about how important weather is. Most of the fire departments in this region are not keying in on the weather, and that is one of the big issues we have to address."
Getting the training noted in the second and third recommendations is not as simple as it might seem. To become a certified volunteer firefighter in Kentucky an applicant must complete at least 150 hours of specified training. "Ninety of those hours are related to structural fire suppression," said Blevlns. "The rest are medical and motor vehicle extraction training. Wildland fire training is not Included. The way it is now some of the departments take the basic wildland courses like S-130 and S-190 on their own initiative, and when they can get it, but it's possible to be a certified firefighter in this state and get dispatched to a wildland fire without ever getting any wildland fire training.
In rural eastern Kentucky, a large percentage of the calls we get are for grass and brush fires, but that Is where we are getting the least amount of training. Our structural training is tied to state funding. If we don't keep a certain percentage of our firefighters certified we don't get state aid, but there is no state mandate for wildland training. That has to change."
All of the training needed for firefighter certification is currently provided through the Kentucky Fire Commission. This includes structural, motor vehicle, hazmat, medical and all other aspects of firefighter training except wildland fire fighting. "The [Kentucky] Division of Forestry and [U.S.] Forest Service have provided some train- ing," said Blevins, "but they've had budgetary cutbacks and for the last couple of years weren't offering much of anything. I don't know who can pick up the ball and run with this, but there really needs to be more emphasis on wildland fire fighting training."
The last two recommendations make a lot of sense, but how to get them funded is a big question. Most volunteer fire departments do not have tax revenues to call on. They depend primarily on fund raising by the firefighters and donations. According to Blevins there are fire departments in eastern Kentucky with an annual operating budget of less than $3,000. Where are they going to get the money to buy fire shelters, Nomex and other wildland gear? "As far as I know," said Blevins, "we were the only department in our county that wore wildland coats on a routine basis." The Route 377 firefighters did not have Nomex pants or fire shelters. Even the radio Nickell had with him was his own property.
The Island Fork Fire Investigation report concludes with this statement: "It is the belief of the entire investigation team that the two fatalities on the Island Fork Fire resulted from the unforeseen Interaction of strong winds and complex terrain. This resulted in a rapidly spreading, high Intensity fire that prevented the two firefighters from using escape routes to reach the safety zone or burned-over area."
We will never know if more training, better weather reports, and availability of fire shelters and other wildland gear would have made a difference, or would have saved the lives of Smith and Nickell, but it is a sure bet that implementing the report's recommendations as quickly and fully as possible can reduce the chance that other firefighters will have to pay the same price that Smith and Nickell did.
Smith had a wife, April, and two children, LeShay, 8, and Kevin Jr., 6. Nickell had a wlfe, Annette, and a four-year-old daughter named Kenna. Both men were good friends and were frequently described as community-oriented and friendly.
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