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The Miller's Reach Fire -- a wakeup call for Alaska

by Larry Haftl
First published in Wildland Firefighter Magazine, June, 1997,

The George Parks Highway is a thin ribbon of concrete that runs through some of the most rugged terrain Alaska has to offer; it connects Anchorage to Fairbanks. The only town along the highway with more than 1,000 residents is Wasilla, 42 miles north of Anchorage. North of Wasilla the road passes through a broad, lowland valley with seemingly endless vistas of arctic swamps and dense black spruce forests. It is not the kind of place that stirs up images of wildland/urban interface fires, but last year it was -- in terms of structures lost -- the site of the worst fire in the United States.

A fire 15 miles north of Wasilla that had been contained at 54 acres exploded. Within three days it destroyed 454 structures, burned more than 37,000 acres, and forced the largest evacuation related to wildland fire in Alaska's history. It was, as several fire management officers said, a wake-up call for Alaska. It drove a major re-evaluation of the fire- fighting structure and services in Alaska, and it gave birth to a statewide public/private partnership dedicated to seeing that it never happens again.

The fire began shortly after 4p.m. June 2 one-half-mile west of the George Parks Highway. Within four minutes of the initial report, the Alaska Division of Forestry's Big Lake office dispatched two engines and a helitack crew. Units from the Houston, Big Lake, Meadow Lakes, and Willow volunteer fire departments were also headed for the fire. By the time Mark Bertels, initial attack IC from the Division of Forestry, arrived at the fire, one Houston Fire Department engine was already taking action. The fire had grown to seven acres, and Bertels immediately requested seven smoke jumpers and an air tanker from the base at Palmer. A few minutes later he asked that a second air tanker be dispatched and another load of smoke jumpers be moved to the Palmer base.

Alaska was in the middle of a serious drought. The winter of 1995 was very cold and dry, and some areas of the state received only a quarter of their normal precipitation. Conditions were so dangerous that fire season was declared open one month earlier than normal. By May 8, firefighters had already responded to 79 fires, well ahead of average for that time of year. Compounding the problem was a series of suspicious fires in the Houston area starting in mid- May. There were two fires on May 14; one burned 120 acres and destroyed three homes. Another on May 17 was named the Miller's Reach Fire because of its proximity to Miller's Reach Road. The fire on June 2 became known as Miller's Reach #2.

Bertels quickly organized local and state firefighters. Within three hours of the initial report, the fire was contained at 54 acres with no structures lost. By 9 p.m. the city and borough firefighters had been released except for one engine, one water tender, and a service vehicle used to supply water for the hose lays running up the right side of the fire. By 4 p.m. the next day, all local firefighters had been released and the remaining firefighters were mopping up. "We had the river on one side and hydraulics on the other side, with lateral hoses every couple of hundred feet," said Bertels, "and we were mopping up 100 feet inside the fire line." A few hours later the fire exploded.

From the time the fire started on June 2, the winds were from the southwest at up to 7 mph. The weather forecast for June 3 called for partly cloudy skies with a chance of showers, temperatures in the low 60s, relative humidity at 30 to 40 percent, and light winds. A few minutes before 4 p.m. Bertels reported to dispatch that the winds were now 7 to 10 mph. Ten minutes later he reported that the relative humidity in the black spruce had dropped to 22 percent. What Bertels didn't know - what no one knew and no one had forecast - was that a gradient was forming between a high pressure area in the north and a low pressure area in the south. During the next few hours, the gradient began to build, and at 7 p.m. it hit the fire at Miller's Reach Road.

"When I first noticed the wind shift, it was only enough to bend the spruce tops a bit," said Bertels. "But within 15 or 20 minutes the wind was gust- ing to 20 or 30 miles per hour."

Within a few minutes of the wind shift, something torched inside the contained fire, blew embers over the fire line, and started a spot fire. The smoke jumpers who were working inside the line on that side of the fire noticed it almost immediately.

"Those smoke jumpers eat fire for breakfast," said Bertels. "They saw it and had laterals off the main trunk on it, and I mean right now."

There was actually more than one spot fire. Two fires right next to each other grew together and started torching. That started a third spot fire about 100 feet farther southeast. It was at that point that the wind shifted and came completely from the north, and increased to a steady 40 to 50 mph.

Bertels was at the south end of the fire. He started running toward the spot fire, and by the time he got there five minutes later his strike leader had already called for a helicopter and an air tanker. As soon as Bertels arrived, he called for a second air tanker. The spot fire was already half-an-acre, and it started surging through the crowns. "The air attack pilot asked me what I wanted, and I said I want to paint this son-of- a-bitch red. I was hoping the air tanker could knock down the head a little bit until we could finish ringing it with hose," said Bertels.

The fire would rip through the crowns for about 100 feet, then slow down and torch while the ground fire caught up to it. "I knew we'd be in trouble if we didn't catch it with the next air drop," he said. "Then the air attack pilot said it was no good, the fire was off to the races. That's when I ordered the evacuation of the Miller's Reach area. The fire blew right past my strike team leader and me like a jet airplane - real loud and real fast."

Bertels told his strike team leader not to let anyone get in front of the fire under any circumstances. Then he started running for Miller's Reach Road half a mile away. "I was flanking the fire and running as fast as I could," he said. "It was a crown fire not supported by a ground fire, and so loud I couldn't use my radio."

Just before Bertels reached the road, the largest contract air tanker in the United States, KC-97, made a salvo drop along the road. The wind was so strong, though, that it dispersed the retardant more than two wingspans, with most of it landing on the road. When Bertels reached the road, he met up with Kevin Koechlein, director of public safety for the Matanuska-Susitna Borough. Koechlein and Bertels had worked together on many fires and immediately formed a unified command. "We were standing on the road in an inch of retardant, fire and smoke on both sides of the road," said Bertels, "and one of my engine foremen comes up and says the fire is already more than a half mile past the road. Kevin looks at me and says, 'What do we do now?' I said, 'We evacuate Big Lake. Now!'"

Because of similarities in climate and environment, Alaska uses the Canadian fire behavior rating system. That system ranks fire behavior into six types, with Type 6 being the most severe. Miller's Reach #2 was more extreme than the standards set for a type 6 fire. It was driven by winds estimated to be in excess of 50 mph. The strong wind kept the smoke column close to the ground. The smoke was so dense with particulates that 200-foot flames were being deflected off the bottom of the smoke column and spreading laterally another 150 to 200 feet.

During the first two hours after escape, the fire spread in an elongated cigar shape six miles long with a head a half mile wide.Then the wind shifted a few degrees. The six-mile-long flank became a six-mile-wide head. It was the first of several wind shifts during the next three days that drove the fire back and forth through the resort communities around the Beaver Lakes and Big Lake. Homes that were saved one day were destroyed the next as the fire returned from a different direction.

Access to the communities in that area is limited to two two-lane roads, one partially paved and the other just gravel. Both roads were threatened and later overrun by the fire. From the moment the fire blew up, the first priority became saving the lives of the 1,000-plus people who live in those communities. "It was really scary knowing where the fire was going," said Koechlein, "and knowing that the people around Big Lake might get cut off. We've taken some flak from people about the evacuation, but I'd rather be arguing with them than their next of kin."

The most amazing statistic of this fire is that while 454 homes and other structures were lost, and egress from the area is severely limited, there were no fatalities. None. In fact the only injuries were to three firefighters who stepped into ash pits during mop-up and received severe burns to their lower legs from undetected embers.

It was the prompt actions of Bertels and Koechlein - along with the determined efforts of the firefighters and Alaska State Troopers - that saved those lives. The fire behavior of Miller's Reach #2 was so extreme that many of the firefighters working on the fire were certain some people would die. "At four o'clock in the morning of June 4, I met with Kevin and Jack Krill, fire chief for the Mat-Su Borough, at our staging area," said Bertels. "I asked them what the body count was. 'You guys got a count yet?' And Kevin says, 'To my knowledge we don't have any fatalities.' I was really expecting fatalities. I was so glad to hear that -- it changed my whole attitude. A lot of people felt the same way I did. After that, all I wanted to do was kick ass on that fire."

The evacuation was not without incident, however. Several of the residents initially refused to leave their homes. Some felt that they should stay and defend their homes -- not only from the fire, but also from possible looters. Others were not convinced they were in serious danger. Determined urging by state troopers and firefighters -- along with dense smoke and an advancing wall of 200-foot-high flames -- finally persuaded even the most reluctant. Eleven of the local firefighters lost their own homes while trying to save the homes and lives of other people.

The fire burned 37,300 acres, destroyed more than $ 15 million in property, and cost $16.5 million to suppress, but fire- fighters saved more than $134 million worth of public and private property, along with 1,082 structures directly threatened by the fire.

Several reviews of the fire were conducted to determine what happened, why it happened, and how some of the problems that occurred during the fire could be avoided in the future. Conduct of the firefighters during initial attack and after the blowup was found to be effective and appropriate given the circumstances, especially the actions of Bertels and Koechlein in quickly ordering the evacuation. But the Type I management team, which assumed command shortly after noon on June 4, was criticized for not understanding the tactical use of structural fire engines in protecting structures from a fast-running wildland fire, for not using local resources adequately or effectively, for not understanding or appreciating the responsibilities of local government, and for not using qualified state and local personnel in overhead or management positions. Other identified problems included severe understaffing and underfunding of the Division of Forestry fire management organization (including the recent elimination of the fire program managers position). There was a breakdown in interagency radio communication, because there is no statewide radio frequency coordination, and the quality of weather forecasting for fire behavior prediction was deemed inadequate. Non- standard implementation of the Incident Command System across fire management agencies in the state was a problem. Also, prior to the Miller's Reach #2 Fire, most of the public was unaware of just how destructive a wildland fire can be. The public was also not aware of steps that can be taken to reduce the risks from such a fire.

The fire had an enormous effect on firefighters. One of the strongest images many of them have is not a particular fire scene, nor is it the homes lost or saved. It is the communities' response to the firefighters. "It was hard to drive through the fire area without people stopping you and trying to feed you/' said Lynn Wilcock, Alaska Division of Forestry fire management officer for that area. "I've been on a lot of wildland fires in the last 25 years, but I've never seen that type of community response to firefighters. I've seen similar things, but nothing on the scale that happened here."

That community support has continued and strengthened long after the fire was put to bed. People all around the state kept asking what they could do to prevent another such disaster. Initial efforts to have elected officials pass codes and ordinances related to types of building materials and requirements for defensible space around structures met with little success, so the fire management and safety officers took it to the people.

"Here in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough," said Koechlein, "we've produced an information program for lending institutions and insurance companies. They are using that information on new construction and home loans. Defensible space inspections are now going to be part of their home inspection programs." Using the information provided by the borough, home appraisers now look at defensible space and fire- related construction. Home buyers are required to correct any problems the appraisers identify as part of the home loan or home insurance process. "It's pretty simple stuff," said Koechlein, "but few people took it seriously before the Miller's Reach fire."

The borough provides fire- related training for appraisers, and has developed public education programs that rely on self-help and private sector incentives and involvement rather than government regulation. These programs were developed in cooperation with companies as diverse as Pepsi, State Farm, local plant nurseries, and building supply outlets. The Pepsi Corporation agreed to design beverage cups and place- mats with a fire prevention theme for statewide distribution during fire season this year. They are also providing banners to be used by local plant nurseries to promote fire-resistant plants and trees, and a fire prevention theater slide program that will be shown in borough theaters prior to the movies. Video rental stores now provide a selection of emergency preparedness and fire prevention videos to the public at no cost. State Farm has provided money and information to the program, distributes the program's information at all of its offices, and provides volunteers to staff program information booths at home shows.

The Miller's Reach #2 Fire was a wake-up call for Alaska, and Alaskans are beginning to respond by taking personal responsibility for reducing the risks of fire in the wildland/ urban interface. That fire, and the Alaskans' response, should be a wake-up call to the rest of the nation. There is a limit to the protection from wildland fire that government can provide.

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